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Abstract: 
We present an ex-post analysis of the effects of GDF’s acquisition of Suez in 2006 created one of the 
world’s largest energy companies. We perform an econometric analysis, based on Difference-in-
Difference techniques on the market for trading on the Zeebrugge gas hub in Belgium. Removing 
barriers to entry and facilitating access to the hub through ownership unbundling were an important 
part of the objectives of the remedies imposed by the European Commission. Our analysis shows a 
price decline after the merger. This decline suggests the remedies were effective in limiting the potential 
anti-competitive effects of the merger. Moreover, it suggests that ownership unbundling has generated 
improved access to the hub. Therefore, the remedies may have done more than simply mitigate the 
potential anti-competitive effects of the merger; they may have effectively created competition. 
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1. Introduction 
Competition policy enforcement activity in the EU energy sectors has increased significantly 
over the last fifteen years, especially with regards to merger cases. Between 2000 and 2014, 
the European Commission (EC) has handled over 270 merger cases in the energy sectors, as 
opposed to 20 in the five years prior to year 2000 (European Commission, DG Competition, 
2015). Moreover, since 2003, a significantly higher share of the merger cases in gas and 
electricity have received in-depth investigations, suggesting an increased level of merger 
scrutiny. As a result of these investigations, the EC has prohibited some mergers, while others 
have been abandoned.1 
 
Some commentators argue that the EC is effectively shaping the overall development of the 
EU gas and electricity markets through its merger policy decisions. It has been said that the 
energy sector has been taken “out of the domain of (national) sector-specific regulation and 
put under the auspices of (EU) competition policy” (Hellwig, 2009). These developments have 
also been seen as “overcoming significant obstacles to Europeanization endemic to the energy 
sector” (Eberlein, 2012), where the EC is using “windows of opportunities” created by large 
European cross border merger proposals (Pakalkaite, 2014). 
 
This is in line with the EC’s view that the EU liberalization directives in energy markets have 
not been wholly effective. Member States have forced a number of compromises to defend 
their national energy champions, which often limited or delayed EU directives’ effectiveness. 
Difficulties securing third party access to transportation capacity, and discrimination in favor 
of vertically integrated businesses, were especially problematic (Harrison and Mordaunt, 
                                                 
1 For example, in 2004 the Commission prohibited the proposed acquisition of joint control over Gás de Portugal 
(GDP), the incumbent gas company in Portugal, by Energias de Portugal (EDP), the incumbent electricity 
company in Portugal, and ENI, an Italian energy company. In 2008, the proposed acquisition of the Hungarian 
oil and gas company, MOL, by the Austrian oil and gas group, OMV, was abandoned following the Commission's 
concerns relating to the combined market share of the companies in several energy markets. 
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2012). Moreover, several Member States failed to fully implement the energy package 
requirements by the deadline. These collective failings - of regulation and of its 
implementation - meant that mergers were more likely to have harmful effects in comparison 
to scenarios where barriers to entry and expansion had been successfully dismantled. As a 
result, merging parties could be required to offer remedies to address the resulting regulatory 
gaps. In reality, some of the EC remedies put in place, in principle to mitigate the potential 
anti-competitive effects of mergers, may have effectively been used to promote market 
liberalisation and to achieve effective unbundling of network and supply activities.  
 
Despite the importance of merger policy in energy markets, we are not aware of any 
retrospective study that provides an ex-post evaluation of the EC’s merger decisions in the 
energy sector. This may be because of complex market structures, where several layers of the 
market coexist (production, wholesale, transmission, distribution, retail), or due to specific 
technical features of energy markets. Notwithstanding these difficulties, retrospective studies 
are essential tools to assess past decisions and improve decision-making for future cases.2 
 
This paper provides, to the best of our knowledge, the first analysis of the direct effects of a 
merger and its associated remedies in the energy sectors. Our case study deals with one of the 
most important mergers in the energy sector of recent decades. The Gaz de France’s (GDF) 
acquisition of Suez in 2006 created one of the world’s largest energy companies and affected 
the electricity and gas markets at several stages in the supply chain in both Belgium and France. 
We focus on the effects in the market for trading on the Belgian gas hub. It is this market in 
which it is most feasible to isolate and quantify the effects of a policy intervention. It also is 
an important part of the imposed remedies by the EC and one of the key dimensions of the 
                                                 
2 A growing number of retrospective studies analyse the effects of mergers in a large variety of other industries. 
See Ashenfelter, Hosken and Weiberg (2009) and Duso (2012) for reviews of the literature. 
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European gas market.3 A hub, if operating efficiently, can promote competition in the market 
and allow for price transparency. This, in turn, results in a reduction in transaction costs, a 
more secure supply and a wider choice for buyers.  
 
Our specific aim is to quantitatively evaluate the price effects of the merger and the remedies 
approved by the EC through a Difference-in-Difference (DiD) analysis on the market for 
trading on the Zeebrugge hub (ZEE hub). Prior to the merger, the ZEE hub suffered limited 
infrastructure access and liquidity issues. Part of the negotiated remedies, which included 
ownership unbundling of network and supply activities, aimed to free up access to the hub. If 
effective, these remedies should have allowed for higher traded volumes and lower prices in 
the hub.  
 
Our evidence suggests that the remedies successfully limited the merger’s potential 
anticompetitive effects. We found not only did prices not increase, but they declined. This 
decline in prices supports the view that ownership unbundling improved access to the hub. 
Therefore, the remedies may have gone further than mitigating the potential anticompetitive 
effects of the merger. Given the absence of indicated efficiency gains by the merging parties, 
our analysis supports the view that the EC’s merger policy actions may have become a tool 
used to liberalize EU energy markets.  
 
There are few studies providing analyses of competition policy enforcement decisions in 
energy markets. Most of the existing studies provide a qualitative, rather than a quantitative, 
analysis. Leveque (2006) argues that competition policy in the energy sector raises specific 
                                                 
3 Gas-trading hubs provide services to facilitate exchanges between buyers and sellers in wholesale markets, 
enabling them to find sufficient volumes of supplies or to sell excess capacity in the short-term. A hub can be a 
physical installation, where gas flows are connected to and pass through this point (as in Belgium) or they can be 
virtual whereby no precise geographical location is specified (as in the UK or in the Netherlands). For an 
interesting account of the development of gas hubs in Europe, see Miriello and Polo (2015). 
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problems which require tailored solutions and call for a tougher approach to mergers.4 
Newbery (2007) compares the approach taken by the EU and the US regarding merger analysis 
in the energy sectors. He claims that, in contrast to the US, mergers between energy companies 
in Europe have been traditionally subject to rather relaxed standards (up until 2005). Pozzi 
(2004) shows that, in a given year, antitrust enforcement activity in the US electricity sector 
has a negative effect on industry profits in subsequent years.  
 
As documented in Federico’s (2011) review of ten merger decisions in the EU, the EC raised 
concerns in a number of them, particularly with respect to the lack of full ownership 
unbundling of network assets and the effects of merging these assets on activities in the 
liberalized parts of the market. In contrast to the view of the EC, the (theoretical) academic 
literature does not provide unambiguous support of the positive effects of ownership 
unbundling, neither in terms of consumer welfare or in terms of its effects on investment 
incentives (Bolle and Breitmoser, 2006, Crémer et al., 2006, and Pollitt, 2008).  
 
There are also few studies that analyze the performance of wholesale gas markets. Most of the 
existing analyses focuses on assessing the degree of integration between hubs, which is, in 
itself, an important goal of the EU energy strategy (but it is also a key part of defining the 
extent of a market for competition policy purposes). Heather (2012) and Petrovich (2013), for 
example, examine the integration of gas hubs using price correlations. Rupérez Micola and 
Bunn (2007) test for the existence of market power on the arbitrages performed between the 
                                                 
4 An interesting debate was sparked by Gas Natural’s launch of a hostile bid on Endesa’s shares in 2005. Two 
groups of leading academic scholars debated regarding the approach the EC should be adopting when facing a 
merger. Barquin et al. (2006) called for a stricter approach to be taken in the case of electricity mergers whereas 
Padilla et al. (2005) argued the opposite. According to Barquin et al. (2006), allowing anti-competitive mergers 
(type II errors) can be more much more detrimental than prohibiting pro-competitive ones (type I errors). This is 
because demand elasticity is very low and therefore the potential loss in consumer surplus from anti-competitive 
mergers is very high. In addition, the efficiency gains from pro-competitive mergers may be limited. Padilla et 
al. (2005), instead, argue that there is no presumption in economics against mergers in the electricity industry. 
They claim that price effects need not be higher than those in other sectors and argue that there is evidence on the 
existence of economies of scale and scope in both the regulated and non-regulated activities of the gas and 
electricity industries. 
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gas hubs in Belgium and the UK, which are linked by the “Interconnector” pipeline. Massol 
and Banal-Estanol (2016) develop a methodology to examine the overall efficiency of the 
arbitrages performed between gas hubs and use the same Interconnector pipeline as a case 
study. 
 
The structure of this paper is as follows: in section 2, we begin by presenting the features of 
the GDF and Suez merger as well as an overview of the industry at that time. We will then 
present the data and econometric analysis of the impact on the market for trading on the ZEE 
hub in section 3. Section 4 concludes and discusses policy implications following on from the 
empirical analysis. 
 
2. The Belgian wholesale gas market and the merger 
This section presents the main features of the GDF/ Suez merger decision within the context 
of the Belgian wholesale gas market and, in particular, of the ZEE hub (for further institutional 
details, see European Commission, 2006). The Belgian gas network is an integrated network 
used for domestic transmission, as well as for international transit. Belgium’s reserved transit 
capacity at the time of the merger represented two-and-a half times the volume of gas 
consumed in Belgium and around 10 per cent of the total consumption in Western Europe 
(CREG, 2006a). The ZEE hub was, and remains, crucial for this transit role; the pipelines that 
go through the ZEE hub are being used almost exclusively for gas transit (Heather, 2012). The 
role of the hub became more prominent leading up to 2006 with the gradual liberalization of 
gas markets. This increased short-term negotiations and gas price arbitrage transactions. 
 
2.1.  The GDF/Suez merger in relation to the Belgian gas sector 
In 2006, GDF and Suez were active on all levels of the Belgian gas sector. The largest energy 
company in the market, Suez group, had a stake of 57 per cent in Distrigas (gas wholesale and 
7 
 
supply) and 57 per cent in Fluxys (gas infrastructure, transit, storage and transport).5,6 Through 
these companies, it also controlled Distrigas & Co (capacity rights selling in transit networks), 
Huberator SA (hub services), Fluxys LNG (terminals), GIE Finpipe (transit network), and 
Segeo (transit network, jointly owned with GDF). GDF was the second largest competitor in 
the gas wholesale and supply markets (see Figure 1). 
 
In sum, while the first two gas directives of the European Parliament (98/30/EC and 
2003/55/EC) had led to “legal unbundling” in both the transit and transmission networks, in 
terms of ownership, Suez controlled a large part of the Belgian gas infrastructure. Domestic 
transmission was solely owned by Fluxys as a monopoly. Fluxys was responsible for the 
management, maintenance and sale of capacity around the transmission network. These 
domestic transmission activities were regulated with regards to third-party access and tariffs, 
subject to Belgian law and to a “code of conduct”. Gas transit infrastructure and capacity rights 
selling was mostly under the control of either Distrigas or Fluxys. Moreover, in 2006, no code 
of conduct or other third-party access document existed in relation to transit activities. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
2.2 The Commission’s merger decision 
On 10 May 2006, the European Commission received prior notification of a concentration 
between the Gaz de France group and the Suez group via an exchange of shares. The 
Commission’s investigation found that, given the horizontal and vertical overlaps between the 
two companies’ activities, the proposed transaction raised significant competition concerns 
                                                 
5 While the firm was originally named Distrigaz, it was later renamed Distrigas. We use Distrigas throughout the 
paper. 
6 Throughout the paper, we refer to Belgian wholesale markets as the import of gas from abroad and trading 
between gas shippers (among others, on the hub). We refer to Belgian supply markets as the markets where gas 
is sold to large customers, power generators or retailers. 
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across all levels of the Belgian gas market (European Commission, 2006). In particular, due 
to control over Fluxys, the EC was concerned about the parties’ control over essential 
infrastructure. In particular, the EC was concerned the parties may have had privileged access 
to supply infrastructure and storage. Despite the existing unbundling provisions, new entrants 
had claimed they lacked effective access with Fluxys being suspected of putting the interests 
of the integrated company first.  
 
The Commission was concerned that the merger might further impede access to the ZEE hub, 
which was suffering access and liquidity issues. Actual or potential competitors of Distrigas 
wishing to access the hub had to obtain capacity rights through an entry/ exit agreement with 
Distrigas & Co, who were capacity rights seller of the transit network. This meant that 
Distrigas & Co could make non-transparent agreements with all hub customers negotiated on 
a bilateral basis. Distrigas itself was also a competitor in the hub, and therefore, their central 
role in making agreements posed a real problem in terms of access. For example, there were 
issues regarding privileged access to information because Distrigas could obtain details of the 
positions of competitors. This may have undermined confidence and discouraged market entry.  
 
In response to these concerns, GDF and Suez offered extensive remedies, including (i) the 
divestiture of the Suez group’s holdings in Distrigas to a third party, and (ii) the restructuring 
of the activities of Fluxys into two entities, Fluxys SA and Fluxys International, and 
relinquishing of all control over these. Fluxys SA was to own the entire Belgian gas 
transmission and transit system and all Belgian gas storage infrastructure. To this end, Suez 
would also transfer Distrigas & Co to Fluxys SA. The parties undertook not to hold more than 
45 per cent of the capital of Fluxys SA (with Publigas holding another 45 per cent). Fluxys 
International was to own the Zeebrugge LNG terminal, Huberator and the other non-regulated 
Belgian and international assets. The parties further agreed not to hold more than 60 per cent 
of the capital of Fluxys International as well as to give partial control of its investment 
activities to the management committee of Fluxys SA. 
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These remedies were intended to facilitate the entry of new competitors and foster competition 
between existing competitors. They were also intended to generate increased access to the hub 
which, in theory, should lead to higher liquidity and volumes traded, and to lower prices. In 
November 2006, as a result of these remedies, the Commission concluded that the merger 
would not significantly impede competition in the European Economic Area or any substantial 
part of it. 
 
3. The empirical analysis 
3.1 The data 
The dependent variable for the empirical analysis is the daily transaction price for day-ahead 
wholesale natural gas traded during working days, as published by Platts, both for the Belgian 
hub (ZEE) and for the Dutch hub (TTF). TTF is the counterfactual we use to identify the causal 
effect of the merger on prices (see the next subsection for a description of our empirical model). 
Our sample period extends from January 2005 until December 2011. For each working day 
(i.e., Monday to Friday), these data reflect the price range of a standardized quantity of natural 
gas to be delivered at a constant flow rate throughout the next working day, after assessment 
(e.g., Friday’s assessment reflects Monday’s delivery). All prices are denominated in €/MWh.7 
 
It would also be interesting to assess the effect of the merger on traded volumes. Unfortunately 
the available data are not suitable for the proposed empirical analysis and therefore this was 
not possible.8 Illustrative evidence indicates that volumes and liquidity at the ZEE hub 
increased after 2008 (European Commission, DG Competition, 2015, pp. 119-120). 
                                                 
7 Given the limited liquidity of within-day markets, the usual convention is followed and we refer to these day-
ahead prices as ‘spot’ since they provide traders with a final opportunity to trade gas out of a forward position 
before physical delivery. 
8 Data on traded volumes are available only since 2007 and only on a monthly basis for the control hub. 
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A set of control variables have been collected from various sources and included in the 
estimation equation. The data sources for the variables used in our analysis are described in 
Appendix A. 
 
3.2 The econometric model 
The empirical analysis aims to quantify the effects of the merger and associated remedies on 
the prices at the ZEE hub. As explained in the previous section, the remedies imposed on the 
merging parties aimed to remove barriers to entry and facilitate access to the hub. In order to 
estimate the effect of the merger on hub prices, we use a Difference-in-Difference (DiD) 
approach – a methodology that is widely used in policy evaluation exercises.9 The basic idea 
behind the DiD methodology is to compare what happened to the treated group (here the ZEE 
hub, which is affected by the merger) before and after the merger with what happened to a 
control group (a comparable hub, see below for a discussion on the selection of such hub). The 
control group represents what would have happened to the treated group in the absence of the 
treatment. The double differencing removes the common factors that might be otherwise 
confounded with the effect of the merger, thereby allowing the identification of the effect of 
the merger on prices. The identification strategy lies therefore on the selection of a suitable 
control group that is comparable to the treated group. We discuss this issue in detail below. 
In our empirical model, hub prices depend on a set of demand- and supply-side variables, as 
well as on merger-related dummies. In particular, we estimate the following equation: 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 + 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  × 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 + +𝜔𝜔1 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜔𝜔2 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 + 𝜔𝜔3 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖+  𝜌𝜌1 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + � 𝜑𝜑𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑,𝑖𝑖 +4
𝑑𝑑=1
� 𝜇𝜇𝑚𝑚𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚,𝑖𝑖11
𝑚𝑚=1
+ � 𝜗𝜗𝑦𝑦𝑌𝑌𝑦𝑦,𝑖𝑖2010
𝑦𝑦=2005
+∊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                                                 
9 Most merger retrospective studies use this methodology. See Weinberg (2008) for a review. 
(1) 
11 
 
The dependent variable pit is the daily price in hub i at time t. The regressors are demand-side 
variables such as season and business cycles (day D, month M, and year Y), as well as 
temperature (temp).10 Supply-side controls are indices of power prices as well as oil products, 
to which gas prices are typically related (power, oil, coal).11,12  
The identification strategy crucially relies on the comparison between the ZEE hub and the 
control hub. The dummy treat is therefore equal to 1 for the treated prices, i.e. prices at the 
ZEE hub. The dummy postj is equal to 1 in the period after each event related to the merger 
took place (as discussed below, we use different definitions of the post period, which explains 
the j subscript). The interaction dummy treat×post is the main variable of interest as its 
coefficient represents the price difference between the ZEE hub and the counterfactual hub 
after the merger-related events.  
 
Finally, we allow for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity of the error terms by estimating 
Newey-West standard errors. In our main specification we assume the maximum lag order of 
autocorrelation to be equal to one week (seven days). In the appendix, we present the results 
of several robustness checks, including different modeling assumptions on the error structure 
(see Section 3.3.3 for a discussion). We discuss our choice of the control hub in section 3.2.1. 
In section 3.2.2 we discuss instead the strategy to identify the effects of the merger and 
associated remedies.  
 
3.2.1 Identification of the control group 
                                                 
10 We also account for non-linearities in the effect of temperature by including a quadratic term in the regression. 
11 Coal prices may influence gas prices as coal and gas plants are both important electricity generators. 
12 Our demand-and supply-side variables are similar to those that Böckers and Heimeshoff (2014) use in the 
estimation of electricity prices. 
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The robustness of the identification strategy depends on the selection of a suitable control 
group which represents what would have happened in the absence of the merger and remedies. 
In principle, the control group should be unaffected by the event and also have similar 
characteristics, in so far as possible, to the treated group. In this context, the choice of the 
control group proves to be a challenging task for several reasons. First, there are no other hubs 
in Belgium, therefore we are required to use a hub in another country as a counterfactual. 
Comparing different countries is generally problematic in the context of a DiD approach, as 
different countries have different institutional features and are, therefore, subject to different 
shocks. However, within this context, we are comparing hubs which, in spite of being located 
in different countries, are marketplaces sharing most features. With this in mind, the structure 
and functioning of the hubs is similar and several market players are active in the same hubs 
in continental Europe.  
 
Another issue representing difficulties with comparator selection is the fact that European hubs 
are, at least to some extent, interconnected. This implies that the possibility that a major event 
affecting one hub does not affect another hub cannot be ruled out.  
 
Taking into account these limitations, we identified the TTF hub in the Netherlands as the most 
similar to the ZEE hub and therefore the most suitable control hub.13 There are three reasons 
for our selection. First, at the time of the merger, the ZEE hub and TTF hub were the two 
largest hubs in continental Europe in terms of liquidity (CREG, 2006b). Second, the degree of 
interconnection between the ZEE hub and the TTF hub was low at the time of the decision. 
Indeed, during their investigation the European Commission concluded that they belonged to 
                                                 
13 One difference between the Belgian hub and the Dutch hub is that the ZEE hub is a physical hub (i.e. where 
the gas physically passes through the hub) while the TTF hub is a virtual hub (i.e. where gas enters only virtually 
after entering into a national system). However, this aspect does not pose too serious problems in terms of 
comparing both hubs, as even in virtual hubs the gas physically passes through, albeit at a national level as 
opposed to a local level. 
13 
 
different markets.14 Third, there is limited data availability for hubs in the mid-2000’s. Data is 
available for the TTF hub, as well as the British hub. The British hub would not be suitable 
because of the high degree of interconnection with the Belgian hub. Therefore, in combination, 
the three reasons described above contributed to our decision to use TTF as the suitable control 
hub. 
 
Figure 2 compares prices at the ZEE hub to those in the Netherlands. This comparison is only 
intended to observe trends at a high level. The two prices follow a similar pattern, consistent 
with the ‘common trend assumption’ on which the DiD strategy hinges. This assumption states 
that the treatment and control group would follow the same trend in the absence of the 
treatment. Some short-term price spikes at the end of 2005 and beginning of 2006 reflect 
external events, including a cold snap in the UK and a shortage in the UK’s main gas storage 
facility due to a fire outbreak. This had an immediate impact on the spot prices given the 
interconnectedness between the Belgian and UK markets.15 
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
3.2.2 Identification of the treatment period 
To quantify the impact of the two main events related to the merger decision, two different 
definitions of the ‘post’ period are used. We can identify two periods as most relevant to assess 
the overall effect of the merger, namely: 
1 The period after the official publication of the Commission’s decision (November 2006). 
                                                 
14 It must, however, be mentioned that the Dutch and UK grids became more connected through the BBL pipeline 
starting in December 2006. This may have indirectly increased the connection between the TTF and ZEE hubs 
through the UK grid.  
15 BBC News. 2006. ‘Gas shortage sends prices soaring’: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4802786.stm. 
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2 The period after the merger was effectively finalised and the different structural remedies 
were implemented. These events took place around June 2008. 
 
Before we explain in detail our identification strategy, it is worth noting that when mergers are 
subject to authorisation, it is common in the retrospective evaluation literature to consider the 
date of the decision as the main relevant date to assess the effect of the merger (see for instance 
Choné and Linnemer, 2012; Björnerstedt and Verboven, 2016; Aguzzoni et al., 2016). In the 
case under consideration, there was a time lapse of more than one-and-a-half-years between 
the Commission’s decision and the actual consummation of the merger and its remedies. Given 
this sequence, the decision most certainly commenced at the time of the merger and remedy 
process. It could be fairly assumed that the parties started negotiating the terms of the merger 
and sale of assets at this time. More generally, it is likely that after the decision, other market 
operators began to adjust their strategies anticipating the finalisation of the merger and its 
remedies. Therefore, an assessment of the price impact at the time of the decision itself is 
important.16  
 
Our identification strategy aims at quantifying both the individual effect of each of the two 
events and their overall effect in the long run. These effects are summarised in Figure 3 below. 
We now describe our identification strategy for both the individual events and the overall effect 
of the merger-related events. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
                                                 
16 There are at least three merger retrospective studies finding evidence of price changes before the merger was 
actually completed (Kim and Singal, 1993; Prager and Hannan, 1998; and Borenstein, 1990). 
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Individual Effects of the Merger Events 
To disentangle the effect of each event, we run two separate regressions on two different 
sample periods, each of which represents the relevant before/ after period around each event. 
The individual effects are therefore identified on a reduced sample period. Since the two events 
are far enough apart in time (more than one and a half year between each other), the number 
of observations on which we identify each treatment effect is quite large. Therefore, these 
should not be regarded as merely short-run effects. They represent the individual effect of each 
merger-related event in the period in which the event is assumed to display its effects.  
 
To measure the effect of each of the two events, we thus consider two different definitions of 
the postj dummies, one for each event j, and of the form: 
𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡1 = �1,         𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡  𝑡𝑡 ∊ (𝑇𝑇1,𝑇𝑇2)    0,                             𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡                        𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡2 = �1,         𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡  𝑡𝑡 ∊ (𝑇𝑇2,𝑇𝑇 )   0,                             𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡       
where T1 and T2 are the dates of event 1 and 2 respectively, and T is the last date in our sample 
period. 
 
Overall Effect of the Decision 
To measure the cumulative effect of the merger and of its associated remedies, we identify the 
treatment effect from a long-run perspective. In particular, we assume that the overall effect 
of the decision can be observed only from when the remedies have been implemented. This is 
done by comparing what happened after all remedies were implemented and the period prior 
the Commission’s decision. We thus estimate the effect of the previously defined post2 dummy 
and exclude the implementation period (December 2006 - May 2008) from the analysis. 
 
(2) 
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3.3 Main results 
We present here the results of the main set of estimations using the econometric framework 
described above. We show here two specifications for each treatment; one where the effect is 
measured from the exact day of each event, and one in which we drop a three-month window 
surrounding the event. This is commonly done in the retrospective merger literature to take 
into account possible anticipation/ delay effects (see subsection 3.3.3 below for further 
discussion on this issue). In both regressions, we estimate Newey-West standard errors while 
allowing for autocorrelation of up to 7 lags.  
 
3.3.1 Individual Effects of the Merger Events 
In Table 1 we present two main sets of regressions, one for each definition of the ‘post’ period, 
corresponding to the two different events related to the merger.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
In the first two columns of Table 1, we present estimation results where the relevant event is 
the Commission’s decision (event 1). As explained above, this regression is run on the period 
January 2005 (beginning of our sample period) to June 2008 (date of event 2). The main 
coefficient of interest is the interaction coefficient Treat*post1, which is negative and 
significant in both specifications. This suggests that there was a price decline at the Belgian 
hub relative to the control hub after the decision. The result is slightly larger if a time window 
around the decision is excluded (column 2). The positive coefficient for the treat dummy 
indicates that prices at the ZEE hub were on average higher than at the TTF hub over the period 
under consideration, controlling for the observable variables. The coefficient for the post 
dummy suggests that prices were not significantly different, on average, in the period after the 
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decision with respect to the period before. The coefficients for the other control variables 
generally have the expected signs, indicating a positive relationship with the prices of other 
inputs and a negative effect of temperatures.  
 
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 1 show instead the results of the regressions that consider the 
effects of the 2008 events, namely the effective divestitures of Distrigas, Distrigas & Co and 
partial divestitures of Fluxys, and the consummation of the merger (event 2). These regressions 
are run on the period from November 2006 (date of event 1) and December 2011 (end of the 
sample period). The coefficients of the treatment effect variable show that the events around 
June 2008 had a negative and significant impact on price at the ZEE hub, relative to our control 
hub. This finding holds true (and is even reinforced) if a window of three months around that 
date is dropped. Note that this is an additional price decrease with respect to the first event. 
This suggests that there was a price decline at the Belgian hub, relative to the control hub, after 
the effective implementation of the merger and associated remedies, although this additional 
effect is smaller than the effect of the decision. 
 
3.3.2 Total Effects of the Merger events 
We also estimate the total effect of the merger and of its associated remedies, assuming that 
this effect can only be observed when the last remedy has been implemented. We thus estimate 
the effect of the previously defined post2 dummy and exclude the implementation period 
(December 2006 to May 2008) from the analysis. As in the three previous sets of estimations, 
we show in Table 2 a regression with Newey-West standard errors at the baseline specification, 
and estimate a regression where we drop a three-month window around the left out period.  
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[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
The interaction coefficients are negative and significant, which provides evidence that the 
overall effect of the merger and of its associated remedies was a decrease in prices at the hub. 
As expected, the magnitude of the estimated overall impact is similar to the sum of the 
estimated individual effects of the two main events, suggesting that these were the principal 
determinants of the merger effect. Other merger-related events may have played a role, but 
they do not seem to be of first-order importance in regards to the realised effect on prices.  
 
3.3.3. Robustness checks 
We now discuss some issues that are potentially problematic for our estimations and provide 
robustness checks and additional analyses intended to overcome these. The results of these 
additional robustness checks are reported in appendix B (Tables B.1 – B.4).  
 
As is usual with high-frequency data, the estimation strategy has to deal with the issue of 
autocorrelation in the error term. We address this in three ways. First, we estimate our 
regressions with Newey-West standard errors, assuming heteroscedasticity and allowing for 
autocorrelation of the error term up to some lag. In our main specification, the specified 
autocorrelation lag is 7, but we also use a 1-lag specification as a robustness check. Another 
common way to deal with this issue is to estimate bootstrapped standard errors, something we 
also undertake as a robustness check. Finally, we reduce the frequency of data from daily to 
weekly.  
 
Retrospective merger studies are faced with the task of correctly defining ‘before’ and ‘after’ 
periods. This task is often challenging because there might be both anticipation effects (i.e. 
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strategic behaviours that may take place before the merger is approved) and delayed effects 
(i.e. it might take time before the merger is finalised, particularly if remedies have to be 
implemented). The same anticipation/ delay effects might also be relevant for remedies. One 
way to at least partially overcome this problem is by excluding from the analysis a time 
window surrounding the merger. It is common practice in the literature to drop the data in a 
three-month or a six-month window around the merger. In order to address this issue, for each 
of the three events we dropped a three-month window. We further checked that our results are 
robust across different definitions of the time windows (one and six months). 
 
Because we have a long time series, we also estimate a specification with real prices rather 
than nominal prices. Finally, we estimate a specification in logs, which should yield a more 
straightforward interpretation of coefficients.  
 
The robustness checks shown in Tables B.1-B.3 in Appendix B yield very similar results to 
those presented in Tables 1 and 2. In particular, in all regressions the coefficient of the 
Treat*Post variable is negative and significant for the first two events and the cumulative 
effects: (i) with real prices instead of nominal prices, (ii) with Newey-West with lower order 
of autocorrelation (lag 1), (iii) with bootstrapped standard errors, (iv) with smaller (1 month) 
or larger (6 months) time windows dropped around the event, and (v) with weekly instead of 
daily data.  
 
Finally, the results for the first event and for the overall effect might partly be driven by the 
large price movements that took place in the period prior to the merger decision.17 In order to 
test the sensitivity of our results to these price shocks, we run our regressions on a reduced 
sample where we cut out the periods with the extreme spikes (November 2005 and March 
2006). The magnitude of the interaction coefficient, shown in Table B.4, becomes smaller but 
                                                 
17 Note that our estimation results for event 2 is affected by the price spikes, since the sample period for the 
corresponding regressions does not include the period before 2007. 
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the sign is unchanged and still significant. This suggests that the size of the effect should be 
interpreted with some caution, but that prices went down in any case around the decision. 
 
4. Conclusions 
The results of the empirical analysis suggest that the Commission’s decision and the 
implementation of the merger and its associated remedies had an impact on wholesale gas 
prices in Belgium. Prices at the ZEE hub fell relative to the TTF hub following the 
Commission’s merger decision (November 2006) and the implementation of associated 
remedies (June 2008).  
 
It is interesting that the first event. i.e., the Commission’s approval of the merger subject to 
conditions, may have had the most significant effect. As argued above, one needs to be 
cautious when drawing implications based on the magnitude of this coefficient as it may partly 
be due to the unusual price movements in the pre-merger period. However, the finding of a 
large coefficient for the merger approval might suggest that there has been an anticipatory 
effect. In particular, as the implementation of the remedies and the consummation of the 
merger took quite some time, it is likely that at least some of the effects took place before the 
merger and remedy events officially occurred. This would imply that the effect of the merger 
decision may partly incorporate the effect of subsequent events.  
 
As a whole, the evidence could suggest that the remedies were effective in limiting the 
potential anti-competitive effects of the merger, as the net effect of merger and remedies shows 
a price decline. It is not possible to disentangle the merger and the remedies, as they occurred 
around the same time. However, the net effect is informative of which effect dominated. The 
estimated decline in prices also supports the view that ownership unbundling has generated 
better access to the hub. In this respect, the remedies seem to have done more than simply 
mitigate the potential anti-competitive effects of the merger. It must be mentioned that one 
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cannot totally exclude that price declines are a consequence of some efficiency gains generated 
by the merger. However, this is unlikely, given that no potential efficiency gains at the hub 
were indicated by the merging parties. 
 
Our results are thus in line with the view that for merger transactions that fall within its 
jurisdiction, the EC can bypass Member States in applying EU merger policy in order to reduce 
the power of national champions. Indeed, through the application of merger remedies, the EC 
can ensure third-party access and unbundle vertically integrated companies. These remedies 
may at first sight seem like an overreach of limiting potential anti-competitive effects. 
However, the European Court of Justice pointed out in its judgement of ENI/EDP/GDP merger 
that there exists no legal problem to the EC pursuing liberalization of energy markets through 
its merger policy actions, as they both share the aim of increasing competition.18 
  
                                                 
18 Case T-87/05 EDP-Energias de Portugal SA v Commission [2005] ECR II-3745. 
22 
 
References 
Aguzzoni, L., E. Argentesi, L. Ciari, T. Duso, and M. Tognoni. (2016). “Ex post merger 
evaluation in the UK retail market for books,” Journal of Industrial 
Economics 64(1): 170–200. 
Ashenfelter,  O., D. Hosken and M. Weinberg. (2009). “Generating Evidence to Guide Merger 
Enforcement,” Competition Policy International 5(1).  
Barquin, J., L. Bergman, C. Crampes, R. Green, C. van Hirchhausen, F. Leveque, and S. Stoft. 
(2006). “The Acquisition of Endesa by Gas Natural: Why the Antiturst Authorities are 
Right to Be Cautious,” Electricity Journal 19(2): 62-68. 
Björnerstedt, J. and F. Verboven. (2016). “Does Merger Simulation Work? Evidence from the 
Swedish Analgesics Market,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 8(3): 
125-64. 
Böckers, V. and U. Heimeshoff. (2014). “The extent of European power markets,” Energy 
Economics 46: 102-11. 
Bolle, F. and Y. Breitmoser. (2006). “On the Allocative Efficiency of ownership unbundling,”. 
European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder) Department of Business Administration 
and Economics Discussion Paper No. 255. 
Borenstein, S. (1990). “Airline Mergers, Airport Dominance, and Market Power,” American 
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 80(2): 400-404. 
Choné, P. and L. Linnemer. (2012). “A Treatment Effect Method for Merger Analysis with an 
Application to Parking Prices in Paris,” Journal of Industrial Economics 60(4): 631-656. 
CREG. (2006a). Etude relative à la concentration prévue entre Gaz de France et Suez. 
(F)060306-CDC-534. 
http://www.creg.be/sites/default/files/assets/Publications/Studies/F534FR.pdf. 
CREG. (2006b). Study on the measures needed to improve the functioning and the liquidity of 
the Zeebrugge hub. (F)060719-CREG-554.  
http://www.creg.info/pdf/Etudes/F554UK.pdf. 
23 
 
CREG. (2008). Structure and functioning of the natural gas market in Belgium in a European 
context: A report prepared by Cambridge Economic Policy Associates. 
www.creg.info/pdf/Etudes/ARCG-CEPA032008.pdf. 
Crémer, H.,  J. Crémer, and P. De Donder. (2006). “Legal Vs Ownership Unbundling in 
Network Industries,” CEPR Working Paper No. 5767. 
European Commission. (2006). Case COMP/M.4180 – Gaz de France/Suez. 14 November 
2006. 
European Commission, DG Competition. (2015). The Economic Impact of Enforcement of 
Competition Policies on the Functioning of Energy Markets: A Report Submitted by ICF 
Consultancy Services in association with DIW Berlin. 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/kd0216007enn.pdf. 
Duso, T. (2012). “A Decade of Ex-post Merger Policy Evaluations: A Progress Report,” in 
Dan Sjöblom (ed.), More Pros and Cons of Merger Control, Stockholm: Swedish 
Competition Authority, 125-87. 
Eberlein, B. (2012). “Inching Towards a Common Energy Policy”, in Jeremy Richardson (ed.), 
Constructing a Policy-Making State?, Oxford University Press, 147–69. 
Federico, G. (2011). “The Economic Analysis of Energy Mergers in Europe and in Spain,” 
Journal of Competition Law & Economics 7(3): 603-29. 
Harrison, D. and A. Mordaunt. (2012) “Mergers in the Energy Sector: An overview of EU and 
National Case Law,” e-Competitions 49024. 
Heather, P. (2012). “Continental European Gas Hubs: Are they fit for purpose?,” The Oxford 
Institute for Energy Studies. http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/NG-63.pdf. 
Hellwig, M. (2009). “Competition Policy and Sector-Specific Regulation for Network 
Industries”, in Xavier Vives (ed.), Competition Policy in the EU, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, p. 203–35. 
Kim, E.H, and V. Singal. (1993). “Mergers and Market Power: Evidence from the Airline 
Industry,” American Economic Review 83(3): 549-69. 
24 
 
Leveque, F. (2006). “Antitrust Enforcement in the Electricity and Gas Industries: Problems 
and Solutions for the EU,” The Electricity Journa. 19(5): 27-34. 
Massol, O. and A. Banal-Estanol. (2016). “Market power and spatial arbitrage between 
interconnected gas hubs,” mimeo. 
Miriello, C., and M. Polo. (2015). “The Development of Gas Hubs in Europe,” Energy Policy 
84: 177-90. 
Newbery, D. (2007). “What are the Issues in M&A arising from Electricity Market 
Restructuring?,” EUI Working paper RSCAS No. 2007/01. 
Padilla, A.J., M. Polo, M. Schnitzer, D. Spector, R. Schmalensee, and X. Vives. (2005). “The 
proposed acquisition of Endesa by Gas Natural: Is there an academic consensus against 
electricity and gas mergers?,” mimeo. 
Pakalkaite, V. (2014). “Competence Creep Through the Backdoor: EU Energy Regulation and 
Competition Policy,” 5th Biennial ECPR Standing Group for Regulatory Governance 
Conference, Barcelona. 
Petrovich, B. (2013). “European gas hubs: how strong is price correlation?,” The Oxford 
Institute for Energy Studies. NG79. 
Pollitt, M. (2008). “The arguments for and against ownership unbundling of energy 
transmission networks,” Energy Policy 36(2): 704-13. 
Pozzi, A. (2004). “Recent development and relevant issues in evolutionary economic and 
industrial dynamics,” Economia e Politica Industriale (123). 
Prager, R.A., and T.H. Hannan. (1998). “Do Substantial Horizontal Mergers Generate 
Significant Price Effects? Evidence From The Banking Industry,” Journal of Industrial 
Economics 46(4): 433–52.  
Rupérez Micola, A., and D.W. Bunn. (2007). “Two markets and a weak link,” Energy 
Economics 29(1): 79-93. 
Weinberg, M. (2008). “The Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers,” Journal of Competition Law 
and Economics 4(2): 433–47.  
 
25 
 
Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1 Stylized overview of the structure of the Belgian gas market before the merger 
 
Based on information sourced from CREG (2008) 
 
Notes: (i) Belgium consumes two different types of natural gas, namely H-gas (with high caloric value) and L-gas (with low caloric value), (ii) the above diagram is a 
simplification and should not be seen as a comprehensive depiction of the Belgian gas market. For example, it does not include the storage segment of the supply chain  
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Figure 2 Evolution of prices at the ZEE hub and at the TTF hub, 2005 - 2011 
 
Source: Platts database. 2013. 
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Figure 3 Individual and overall effects of the events related to the merger 
 
  
T1 - Event 1 
(Nov 2006) 
Jan 
2005 
Dec 
2011 
T2 - Event 2 
(Jun 2008) 
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Table 1 – Price effects of individual events 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Baseline 3-month 
dropped 
time window 
Baseline 3-month 
dropped time 
window 
     
Treat 2.593*** 2.940*** 0.235*** 0.224*** 
 (0.576) (0.601) (0.0610) (0.0655) 
Post1 1.339 -0.597   
 (1.358) (2.646)   
Treat*Post1 -2.364*** -2.604***   
 (0.586) (0.612)   
Post2   0.351*** 0.456*** 
   (0.101) (0.109) 
Treat*Post2   -0.384*** -0.410*** 
   (0.0721) (0.0755) 
Power  0.00296 0.00226 0.00105 0.000926 
 (0.00532) (0.00505) (0.000724) (0.000729) 
Oil  0.670*** 0.661*** 0.970*** 0.972*** 
 (0.0925) (0.0978) (0.00617) (0.00626) 
Coal  0.166* 0.161* -0.0219 -0.0224* 
 (0.0971) (0.0959) (0.0134) (0.0131) 
Temperature -0.226** -0.242** -0.00480 -0.00466 
 (0.104) (0.110) (0.0103) (0.0103) 
Temperature squared 0.00552 0.00595 5.43e-05 0.000109 
 (0.00351) (0.00367) (0.000446) (0.000446) 
Constant -6.713 -6.365 1.177*** 1.166*** 
 (5.689) (5.756) (0.301) (0.301) 
Observations  1,759 1,636 2,586 2,460 
F-test 597.95 571.31 7,652.96 6,986.05 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: The dependent variable is the daily gas price at the hub. In all specifications, we also include 
day, month, and year dummies. Newey-West standard errors are reported in parentheses. The 
symbols ***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively. 
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                   Table 2 - Overall price effects of merger events 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Baseline 3-month 
dropped 
time 
window 
Treat 2.595*** 2.940*** 
 (0.576) (0.602) 
Post2 3.964 4.231 
 (2.900) (2.892) 
Treat*Post2 -2.734*** -3.116*** 
 (0.584) (0.610) 
Power  0.00135 0.000705 
 (0.00854) (0.00872) 
Oil  0.717*** 0.717*** 
 (0.0760) (0.0771) 
Coal  0.00198 0.00362 
 (0.0505) (0.0509) 
Temperature -0.143** -0.147** 
 (0.0644) (0.0648) 
Temperature squared 0.00333 0.00378 
 (0.00236) (0.00244) 
Constant 3.288 3.058 
 (3.134) (3.219) 
Observations  2,715 2,588 
F-test 633.93 581.74 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the daily gas price at the hub. In both specifications, 
we also include day, month, and year dummies. Newey-West standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, 
10% levels respectively. 
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Appendix 
A. Data 
The variables used in the estimation, together with their corresponding data sources, are 
reported in Table A.1 below, with the descriptive statistics reported in Table A.2. 
Table A.1 Description of the variables 
Variable Description and source 
Price Daily hub prices at time t for hub i. Measured in €/MWh (Source: Platts data 
base) 
Treat Treat dummy, 1 for Zee hub prices in BE and 0 for TTF hub price in NL 
Post1 Post dummy set to 1 for time after Commission’s merger decision (14 Nov 2006) 
Post2 Post dummy set to 1 for time after merger and remedies were effective (30 June 
2008)19 
Temperature Daily temperature data for Belgium and the Netherlands in degrees Celsius 
(Sourced: national administrative bodies). 
Temperature Squared Square of temperature 
Oil  Daily spot price for Brent crude oil. Measured in $/bbl (Source: Platts data base) 
Coal Average daily price of coal. This is a combined price series of two sources which 
measures the daily European reference price for coal imports into North-Western 
Europe. 
Power  Daily price at the power exchange. Since the Belgian Power Exchange (Belpex) 
started operating on 21 November 2006, there is no data for Belgium before 
2007. Dutch power prices for 2005 and 2006 are used as a proxy for this time 
period20 (Source: Platts Database). 
Day Dummy variables for each day of the week 
Month Dummy variables for each month 
Year Dummy variables for each year 
  
                                                 
19 We do not know the exact dates of the June 2008 remedies. Furthermore, in July 2008 the merger was 
finalized. We choose therefore an intermediate date (30 June) as our relevant treatment date, which aims to 
capture both the remedies and the finalization of the merger. 
20 We tested whether Dutch power prices were similar enough to the Belgian ones: the correlation between 
the two price series at later dates is high (.93) and therefore deemed to be high enough to use as a proxy for 
this gap in the data series. 
31 
 
Table A.2 Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the estimation 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Price 3,532 18.77 6.96 3.89 98.44 
Treat 3,532 0.5 0.5 0 1 
Post1 3,532 0.73 0.44 0 1 
Post2 3,532 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Temp 3,532 10.77 6.47 -10.07 28.4 
Oil  3,532 19.10 7.95 3.88 98.43 
Coal  3,532 16.97 19.42 0.01 75.1 
Power 3,532 61.82 26.91 16.32 432.83 
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B. Additional tables and robustness checks 
Table B.1   Robustness checks on the effects of the Commission’s decision (Event 1) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Baseline 
(Robust s.e.) 
Real prices Logs Newey- 
West s.e. 
(1 lag) 
Bootstrap 1-month 
window 
6-month 
window 
Weekly 
average 
         
Treat 2.593*** 2.162*** 0.0683*** 2.593*** 2.593*** 2.659*** 3.320*** 2.519*** 
 (0.266) (0.257) (0.00836) (0.350) (0.269) (0.271) (0.299) (0.563) 
Post1 1.339* 1.451** 0.0404** 1.339 1.339* 1.210 1.076*** 1.102 
 (0.730) (0.702) (0.0197) (0.921) (0.718) (0.993) (0.365) (1.509) 
Treat* Post1 -2.364*** -2.506*** -0.0590*** -2.364*** -2.364*** -2.399*** -2.991*** -2.290*** 
 (0.271) (0.262) (0.00885) (0.357) (0.275) (0.276) (0.321) (0.573) 
Power  0.00296 0.00225 0.0180* 0.00296 0.00296 0.00337 0.0112** 0.00535 
 (0.00418) (0.00401) (0.0104) (0.00456) (0.00428) (0.00416) (0.00535) (0.0135) 
Oil  0.670*** 0.656*** 0.787*** 0.670*** 0.670*** 0.671*** 0.723*** 0.656*** 
 (0.0518) (0.0501) (0.0229) (0.0658) (0.0523) (0.0525) (0.0471) (0.112) 
Coal  0.166*** 0.143*** -0.0297*** 0.166*** 0.166*** 0.168*** -0.0253*** 0.165* 
 (0.0453) (0.0439) (0.00463) (0.0605) (0.0468) (0.0461) (0.00694) (0.0969) 
Temperature -0.226*** -0.222*** -0.00355* -0.226*** -0.226*** -0.226*** -0.132* -0.280** 
 (0.0647) (0.0630) (0.00187) (0.0774) (0.0643) (0.0649) (0.0671) (0.141) 
Temperature squared 0.00552** 0.00547** 6.31e-05 0.00552** 0.00552** 0.00551** 0.00181 0.00668 
 (0.00217) (0.00212) (6.60e-05) (0.00258) (0.00219) (0.00218) (0.00239) (0.00542) 
Constant -6.713** -4.526* 0.615*** -6.713* -6.713** -6.951** 4.454*** -6.294 
 (2.674) (2.585) (0.0717) (3.538) (2.690) (2.790) (1.267) (5.671) 
Observations 1,759 1,759 1,759 1,759 1,759 1,719 1,512 366 
R2 0.8538 0.8526 0.9269 - 0.8538 0.8544 0.8411 0.8633 
F test 1,995.93 1,695.22 3,004.64 1,255.90 - 2,000.09 195.95 555.51 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: The dependent variable is the daily gas price at the hub. In all specifications, we also include day, month, and year dummies. Newey-West standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively. 
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Table B.2   Robustness checks on the effects of the merger and remedies’ implementation (Event 2) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Baseline 
(Robust s.e.) 
Real prices Logs Newey- 
West s.e. 
(1 lag) 
Bootstrap 1-month 
window 
6-month 
window 
Weekly 
average 
         
Treat 0.235*** -0.339*** 0.00948*** 0.235*** 0.235*** 0.225*** 0.187*** 0.225*** 
 (0.0323) (0.0307) (0.00208) (0.0402) (0.0330) (0.0329) (0.0358) (0.0610) 
Post2 0.351*** 0.264*** 0.0179*** 0.351*** 0.351*** 0.365*** 0.487*** 0.371*** 
 (0.0613) (0.0573) (0.00287) (0.0708) (0.0604) (0.0628) (0.0705) (0.103) 
Treat* Post2 -0.384*** -0.632*** -0.0213*** -0.384*** -0.384*** -0.386*** -0.402*** -0.381*** 
 (0.0396) (0.0379) (0.00249) (0.0482) (0.0402) (0.0401) (0.0422) (0.0718) 
Power  0.00105** 0.00147*** 0.0128*** 0.00105* 0.00105* 0.00105** 0.000927* 0.000243 
 (0.000524) (0.000470) (0.00368) (0.000596) (0.000546) (0.000525) (0.000529) (0.00158) 
Oil  0.970*** 0.892*** 0.960*** 0.970*** 0.970*** 0.971*** 0.979*** 0.977*** 
 (0.00378) (0.00340) (0.00479) (0.00445) (0.00376) (0.00381) (0.00374) (0.00697) 
Coal  -0.0219** -0.00493 -0.00383*** -0.0219** -0.0219** -0.0220** -0.0236*** -0.0186 
 (0.00868) (0.00878) (0.00111) (0.00911) (0.00885) (0.00865) (0.00849) (0.0140) 
Temperature -0.00480 -0.00480 7.55e-05 -0.00480 -0.00480 -0.00374 -0.00374 -0.00125 
 (0.00759) (0.00757) (0.000388) (0.00840) (0.00752) (0.00758) (0.00755) (0.0153) 
Temperature squared 5.43e-05 -2.09e-05 -6.03e-06 5.43e-05 5.43e-05 -1.38e-05 0.000224 -0.000154 
 (0.000331) (0.000326) (1.65e-05) (0.000365) (0.000331) (0.000331) (0.000332) (0.000689) 
Constant 1.177*** 2.413*** 0.0436*** 1.177*** 1.177*** 1.166*** 1.078*** 1.064*** 
 (0.170) (0.157) (0.0138) (0.203) (0.174) (0.170) (0.167) (0.327) 
Observations 2,586 2,586 2,586 2,586 2,586 2,546 2,336 534 
R2 0.9938 0.9930 0.9936 - 0.9938 0.9938 0.9935 0.9963 
F test 20,596.61 17,148.35 19,997.85 14,870.81 - 19,886.89 19,708.92 7,642.00 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: The dependent variable is the daily gas price at the hub. In all specifications, we also include day, month, and year dummies. Newey-West standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively. 
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Table B.3 Robustness checks on the long-run effect (overall effect) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Baseline 
(Robust s.e.) 
Real prices Logs Newey- 
West s.e. 
(1 lag) 
Bootstrap 1-month 
window 
6-month 
window 
Weekly 
average 
         
Treat 2.604*** 2.175*** 0.0678*** 2.595*** 2.595*** 2.660*** 3.306*** 2.522*** 
 (0.277) (0.263) (0.00839) (0.350) (0.260) (0.271) (0.306) (0.558) 
Posttotal 1.237*** 0.0226 0.0491*** 3.964** 3.964*** 4.936*** 1.543*** 3.992 
 (0.237) (0.222) (0.00824) (1.798) (1.344) (1.759) (0.296) (3.020) 
Treat* Posttotal -2.746*** -3.137*** -0.0794*** -2.734*** -2.734*** -2.811*** -3.512*** -2.667*** 
 (0.282) (0.265) (0.00859) (0.355) (0.264) (0.274) (0.312) (0.565) 
Power  0.00315 0.00577 -0.0168* 0.00135 0.00135 0.00151 0.000293 0.000959 
 (0.00647) (0.00614) (0.0101) (0.00712) (0.00633) (0.00646) (0.00648) (0.0175) 
Oil  0.785*** 0.728*** 0.832*** 0.717*** 0.717*** 0.718*** 0.779*** 0.716*** 
 (0.0350) (0.0330) (0.0174) (0.0542) (0.0417) (0.0428) (0.0365) (0.0920) 
Coal  -0.0327*** -0.0283*** -0.0244*** 0.00198 0.00198 0.00741 -0.0310*** 0.00330 
 (0.00558) (0.00534) (0.00253) (0.0315) (0.0235) (0.0250) (0.00710) (0.0528) 
Temperature -0.0451 -0.0739** -0.00382*** -0.143*** -0.143*** -0.145*** -0.0612* -0.167* 
 (0.0345) (0.0330) (0.00115) (0.0450) (0.0362) (0.0369) (0.0345) (0.0856) 
Temperature squared 0.000370 0.000960 0.000102** 0.00333** 0.00333** 0.00346** 0.00129 0.00381 
 (0.00140) (0.00133) (4.07e-05) (0.00169) (0.00139) (0.00140) (0.00143) (0.00372) 
Constant 3.469*** 4.434*** 0.574*** 3.288 3.288** 2.899* 3.448*** 3.257 
 (0.675) (0.646) (0.0584) (2.013) (1.556) (1.625) (0.873) (3.204) 
Observations 2,715 2,715 2,715 2,715 2,715 2,675 2,464 560 
R2 0.8622 0.8702 0.9467 - 0.8773 0.8766 0.8584 0.8850 
F test 279.72 256.39 5,112.40 1,658.09 - 2,582.11 222.28 697.62 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: The dependent variable is the daily gas price at the hub. In all specifications we also include day, month, and year dummies. Newey-West standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively. 
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                       Table B.4  Robustness checks dropping periods of price spikes  
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Effect of event 1 
with two months 
dropped 
Long-run effect 
with two months 
dropped 
Treat 1.341*** 1.342*** 
 (0.418) (0.421) 
Post 0.783 1.414 
 (0.982) (2.412) 
Treat*Post -1.114*** -1.483*** 
 (0.430) (0.427) 
Power  0.000648 -0.00198 
 (0.00201) (0.00269) 
Oil  0.731*** 0.789*** 
 (0.0712) (0.0570) 
Coal 0.103 -0.0261 
 (0.0757) (0.0411) 
Temperature -0.195* -0.140** 
 (0.106) (0.0637) 
Temperature 
squared 
0.00522 0.00378* 
 (0.00340) (0.00198) 
Constant -2.946 4.528* 
 (4.225) (2.411) 
Observations 1,669 2,625 
F test 880.77 1,031.08 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 
The dependent variable is the daily gas price at the hub. The sample size cut out 
November 2005 and March 2006 (the periods with the most extreme spikes). We 
control for prices of gas, oil, and coal, as well as temperature (both linear and 
quadratic), day, month, and year dummies. Newey-West standard errors with 7 lags 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively. 
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